How the AUKUS Caucus built a cargo cult and called it strategy.
There’s a certain kind of Australian politician who never quite grew out of childhood. You know the type: Richard Marles, Tony Abbott, Christopher Pyne. Peter Pan to a man. Their eyes light up whenever a Pentagon staffer remembers their name. They sit bolt upright like kelpie pups on the back of the ute, ears pricked for master’s return. They mistake condescension for intimacy, patronage for partnership, obedience for relevance.
Marles, Pat Conroy (Defence Industry), and Brendan O’Connor (Veterans’ Affairs) along with “Rear Admiral-Albo” and Wayfinder Penny Wong make up the AUKUS Caucus: a dream team. Not bound by evidence, timelines, or arithmetic; only by faith. Faith that if Australia sends enough money, bases and deference across the Pacific, the Great Mate in the Sky will someday descend bearing nuclear submarines and strategic salvation.
Australia’s $368 billion imaginary friend.
The Cargo Cult Playbook
Cargo cults arise when isolated societies witness advanced powers arrive with miraculous technology. Locals build imitation runways; light signal fires hoping the planes will return. The AUKUS Caucus has updated the ritual for the modern age. Our runways are ports. The offerings are our sovereignty. The signal fires are AUSMIN pressers. And the planes, as ever, do not land.
Richard Marles, Labor’s embattled Defence Minister, is the cult’s high priest. Asked about implementation delays, he smiles wanly and intones the sacred words: “Full steam ahead.” Full steam ahead to where is never explained.
AUKUS is sold as strategic realism. In practice, it operates as faith: belief substituted for capacity, ritual for delivery, loyalty for leverage.
The Hegseth Problem
This week Marles and Wong flew to Washington for the annual, ceremonial abasement known as AUSMIN. Their opposite number is Pete Hegseth. Former Fox News shouter, veterans’ charity mismanager, and a chap once carried from a strip club by mates after trying to storm the stage. Now improbably directing US defence as Secretary of War.
Hegseth’s character matters because AUKUS asks us to entrust our strategic future to decision-makers whose judgment, attention span and institutional grip are already demonstrably strained. His own mother calls him as an “abuser of women” who “belittles, lies and cheats,” urging him to “get some help and take an honest look at yourself.”
When a nation stakes $368 billion on the judgment of a man disqualified by his own mother from trust, it has crossed from strategy into pathology.
8 December, Marles and Wong are pictured nodding earnestly as Hegseth endorses a $368 billion submarine fantasy he cannot possibly deliver. He barks approval of AUKUS as “pragmatic hard power.” Wong, cryptic as ever, merely echoes Trump’s mantra: “full steam ahead.” The boats are not coming, so who cares what fuels the boiler?
The Pragmatic Hard Power Con
Pragmatic hard power? It could be a new brand of laundry detergent. The absurdity runs deeper than performance.
Australia is trading real sovereignty for imaginary submarines.
AUKUS legislation effectively transfers operational priority and access over key Australian military bases to the US. The terminology is pure institutional dissemblance: “expanded US rotational presence” and “integrated command arrangements.” In plain English: we concede control over our own strategic assets. We slip a few lazy billion to US and British shipyards to “expedite” production; meaning we subsidise their accumulated backlogs. We bind our “defence posture” so thoroughly into US command that when Washington sneezes, Canberra catches cold.
But we do get to wave flags. Hum anthems. Pay invoices.
Each concession merits national debate. Yet, the AUKUS Caucus has sealed the deal without meaningful parliamentary inquiry, without detailed public costings, only an “oversight” committee denied subpoena power, denied independent costing, and so carefully neutered it might as well be chaired by a shredder.
The Legal Trap
And yes, the legal architecture is exactly what critics feared. Under the agreement, Australia provides $4.7 billion (with more coming) to US and UK submarine builders, and according to questioning in Senate Estimates, there is no clawback provision; Australia does not get its money back if the US fails to transfer nuclear submarines.
The AUKUS agreement allows any party to withdraw with one year’s notice. But here’s the lethal asymmetry: Australia’s payments are subsidies, not deposits; they are not refundable, and there is no guarantee that the submarines will ever be delivered.
The US and UK can walk away at any time. They keep the cash, the upgrades, the expanded industrial bases and the sovereign right to prioritise their own needs. Which, as serious countries, they will do.
Australia, meanwhile, is padlocked like a rental fridge in a share-house. Jiggle the handle all you like, but the thing won’t open unless the bloke with the key decides you’ve paid up.
A Big Perhaps
At some point, the more unsettling explanation has to be entertained. Perhaps the submarines are not delayed. Perhaps they are not even expected. Perhaps AUKUS is not failing at all, but performing exactly as intended. The money flows early and without clawback. The bases open. Command structures integrate. Strategic dependency is formalised. The submarines remain permanently over the horizon, always promised, never required. If this were a ruse designed to secure American basing access and regional posture while outsourcing the political pain to future governments, it would be hard to design it differently. Whether Australia’s political class believes its own story, or merely finds it convenient, becomes almost beside the point. The outcome is the same.
And whatever the truth of the submarines, Defence needs a bit of a rescue.
Defence’s House of Horrors
Marles’ predicament worsens when you look at Defence itself: a moral, administrative and institutional nightmare he inherited and, like his predecessors, Linda Reynolds and Peter Dutton, has failed to master. Could anyone? Australia’s predicament worsens also.
The Brereton inquiry exposed 39 unlawful killings in Afghanistan. The stain remains. Atop this moral wreckage sits administrative farce: a Defence official leaked confidential information before walking straight into a job with a private weapons contractor.
The Hunter class frigates tell the broader story. What began life as a $45 million per ship concept has metastasised into $2.6 billion per ship, with hundreds of millions in variations already locked in, and the program at least 18 months late due to design immaturity.
When Labor took office, 28 major Defence projects were running a combined 97 years behind schedule, with roughly a quarter of procurement unfunded. Over it all looms $368 billion we’ve agreed to throw at AUKUS, as a $60 billion annual defence budget swells toward $100 billion by 2034, absorbing failure without correcting it. (AUKUS costs are a guess, announced without consulting Treasury, Parliament or any other authority.)
What Do We Actually Get?
And what does Australia receive for this tithe?
- Not submarines.
- Not even capability.
- A promise.
Five SSN AUKUS boats to be built in Adelaide at some conveniently indeterminate date. Early 2040s if all goes well. If Britain remembers how to build submarines at scale. If the US has spare industrial capacity. If history pauses politely to accommodate our fantasy.
The BAE Systems Track Record
BAE Systems, cast as AUKUS’s industrial saviour, spent two decades struggling to deliver the UK’s Astute class submarines. Early boats ran five years late. Costs ballooned by roughly 50 percent. By 2009 an extra £1.35 billion had already been added. Later boats pushed delays to six years, with total overruns well past £1.3 billion.
This is the outfit now promising that, once a few more billion pounds are poured into Barrow shipyard, it will produce a brand new nuclear submarine every 18 months. A tempo unseen since the Cold War. The same system that took two decades to crawl through one troubled program now offers to sprint through a more complex shared design.
Policy? No. It’s magical thinking with a Gantt chart.
The Pillar Two Mirage
When reality intrudes, the faithful point to Pillar Two, the sideshow of defence tech collaboration; AI, cyber and hypersonics; meant to suggest strategic depth where there is only debt. Scott Morrison dubbed it “AUKUS in Space,” as if adding a preposition and some stars transformed a lopsided submarine purchase into visionary strategy.
But the real achievement is rhetorical: substituting buzz-words for credible policy. In this sense, AUKUS is Scott Morrison’s most enduring legacy.
The Question Marles Won’t Answer
No-one likes a smart-arse but the pitiful Richard Marles still cannot explain why nuclear submarines are worth this ruinous spend when modern diesel-electric boats exist.
Modern diesel-electric submarines provide maximum range, endurance and stealth, operating underwater before having to resurface to snorkel and recharge batteries. Australia’s own Collins-class diesel submarines demonstrated during 2003 multinational exercises that they were comparable in underwater warfare to US Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, trading roles and achieving , successful attacks despite being smaller and less powerful.
Cheaper, crewable, already in production from many European and Asian shipyards; they could patrol our seas this decade, not as a thought experiment for the 2040s. Proven alternatives include the Naval Group Scorpene class, in service with Malaysia, India and Brazil, or the Type 212/214 and Type 218SG submarines designed by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, each optimised for shallow water operations, sea control and maritime interdiction.
Marles’ silence on these alternatives is not diplomacy. It is concealment. And on the Pentagon review? He defers to the gods. Never mind that US shipyards face challenges in producing Virginia-class submarines at the rate needed to sustain domestic needs. Never mind that the “strategic environment” supposedly demanding these submarines will have mutated several times before a single SSN AUKUS is afloat.
The Keating Indictment
Let us be clear. This is not alliance. It is abdication with a flag on it. It is not strategy. It is superstition dressed up as seriousness and invoiced to the taxpayer.
Australia has not been made safer by this arrangement. It has been made smaller. Smaller in judgment. Smaller in autonomy. Smaller in its willingness to say no when no is the only adult answer available.
We are told this is the price of maturity. In truth, it is the price of political adolescence: the desperate need to be liked by bigger boys, the fear of standing alone, the refusal to do the hard work of thinking for ourselves.
A nation that spends $368 billion on a promise, while surrendering control over real assets in the present, is not hedging risk. It is institutionalising delusion. Serious countries build capabilities. They do not build faith-based procurement programs and call them deterrence.
The Runway at Dusk
For $368 billion, AUKUS is not a procurement program. It is a wager on dependency.
Australia is paying staggering sums for submarines that do not yet exist, to be built by industries in chronic difficulty, on timelines that belong to fantasy, while ceding real autonomy over real assets in the present. In return, we receive reassurance. Access. Attention. The comforting sense that someone larger, louder and more heavily armed is standing somewhere behind us.
This is not how confident countries behave. Confident countries invest in capabilities they can crew, afford and deploy. They debate trade-offs openly. They do not confuse faith with strategy or obedience with influence.
AUKUS has shrunk Australia’s strategic imagination at precisely the moment it should have been expanding it. We have narrowed our options, mortgaged our future, and told ourselves it is maturity. In truth, it is fear wearing the language of realism.
History will not ask whether the submarines eventually arrived. It will ask why a nation willingly surrendered so much, so early, for so little certainty in return. And it will judge us not by the promises we believed, but by the choices we made when the risks were already plain.
Urban Wronski Writes 
The whole AUKUS con job is beyond satire. There are no ‘adults in the room’ in Washington and none among our political representatives. The sheer madness of the figures involved, the non-guarantees ‘committed’ to, the bowing and scraping to tRump’s goons just defy belief. And our uniparty means we’re stuck with this mess.
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Llama: I hear you. What’s striking about AUKUS isn’t just the price tag or the diplomatic theatre; it’s the way the whole arrangement has been framed as inevitable, as if public scrutiny is some kind of national security threat. Many people are concerned about the scale of the commitments, the lack of clear guarantees, and the way successive governments have treated bipartisan silence as a virtue rather than a warning sign.
There’s a legitimate debate to be had about sovereignty, transparency, and whether this deal actually strengthens Australia’s long‑term security or simply locks us into obligations we don’t control. When people describe it as a “con job,” they’re often responding to that sense of being handed a bill without being shown the menu.
What matters now is insisting on accountability; real numbers, real timelines, real oversight, and refusing to accept that critique equals disloyalty. A democracy isn’t supposed to run on blind faith, and people are right to demand more than slogans and handshakes.
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Lets face it this AUKUS money is not taxpayers money as such. It is money brought into being and placed on a national account seperate to everything. Which is also an example of how we could fund all the things we need, like Dental Health on Medicare, New Infrastructure like high speed rail. All this taxpayers money BS is just that BS.
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Pleasantlyelectronic … It’s true that the way governments fund major projects like AUKUS isn’t as simple as “taking taxpayers’ money and handing it over.” Modern economies operate on fiat currency, which means governments can create money through mechanisms like issuing bonds or expanding the balance sheet of the central bank. In that sense, the “national account” idea you mention reflects how sovereign governments with their own currency (like Australia) have more flexibility than a household budget.
But here’s the catch: while governments can create money, they still face constraints. Printing or borrowing too much without balancing it against the productive capacity of the economy risks inflation, currency devaluation, or crowding out other priorities. That’s why policymakers often frame spending in terms of “taxpayers’ money”—it’s a way of grounding the debate in fiscal responsibility, even if the mechanics are more complex. It’s quite misleading and there are any number of MPs who insist that the nation’s economy is just like a household’s it isn’t. Nor are “taxpayers” quite the generic group implied – and of course governments derive income from a range of sources.
Your point about dental health and infrastructure is valid though: if we can mobilise billions for defence, it raises the question of political will. Funding priorities are ultimately about choices—what leaders decide is “essential.” AUKUS shows that when something is deemed strategically vital, the money is found. The same could be true for Medicare dental or high-speed rail if the political consensus existed. Or even upping the Age Pension and Centrelink to a liveable wage.
I have written about MMT and your comment leads me to believe that it’s worth revisiting.
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